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Abstract
This paper presents the integrated project TURBINE
which is funded under the EU 7th research framework pro-
gramme. This research is a multi-disciplinary effort on pri-
vacy enhancing technology, combining innovative develop-
ments in cryptography and fingerprint recognition. The ob-
jective of this project is to provide a breakthrough in elec-
tronic authentication for various applications in the physi-
cal world and on the Internet. On the one hand it will pro-
vide secure identity verification thanks to fingerprint recog-
nition. On the other hand it will reliably protect the bio-
metric data through advanced cryptography technology. In
concrete terms, it will provide the assurance that i) the data
used for the authentication, generated from the fingerprint,
cannot be used to restore the original fingerprint sample,
ii) the individual will be able to create different ”pseudo-
identities” for different applications with the same finger-
print, whilst ensuring that these different identities (and
hence the related personal data) cannot be linked to each
other, and iii) the individual is enabled to revoke an bio-
metric identifier (pseudo-identity) for a given application in
case it should not be used anymore.
1. Introduction
A pressing issue in European jurisdictions is, how to pro-
tect biometric data in eGovernment-, eHealth-, eFinance-
Applications. The key concern here is how to ensure that
high security and data protection needs can be simultane-
ously satisfied while also ensuring ease of use and flexi-
bility. Moreover the fingerprint as a biometric characteris-
tic is widely associated with forensic applications. These
concerns become obvious once we investigate the follow-
ing typical application scenarios for biometric fingerprint
recognition:
1. Registered Customer Application (RCA)
The individual is interested to participate in - and bene-
fit from - an eCommerce or eFinance application. The
operator of the application is considered as service
provider. The individual generates for each applica-
tion a unique biometric identifier (the ”pseudo iden-
tity”), such that each application the client is associ-
ated with a different pseudo-identity. The client ver-
ifies his pseudo-identity prior to each transaction or
consumption of the offered service. Each transaction
will be charged to the individuals account subsequent
to the transaction.
However a concerned individual may have limited trust
to the service provider and does neither want the ser-
vice provider to store his fingerprint images (nor de-
rived features such as minutiae data) at enrolment, nor
does the individual want to provide fingerprint images
with each transaction.
2. eGovernment Customer Application (GCA)
The individual is interested to participate in and ben-
efit from an eGovernment application. The operator
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represents a public administration (municipality, state
etc.). The individual (the client) is citizen of the mu-
nicipality / state and verifies his pseudo-identity prior
to each transaction or consumption of the offered ser-
vice. Each transaction is linked to his real identity (cit-
izen number) and some transactions may be charged to
the individuals account subsequent to the transaction.
Requirements and concerns for this scenario are equiv-
alent with the previous RCA-scenario with the follow-
ing exception that establishing a link to a payment
scheme might be obsolete, if the municipality / state
decides to offer the service free of charge. Furthermore
issuing a token might be obsolete, if a valid govern-
mental token can be used instead (eID-Card, eHealth-
Card, European Citizen Card derivate, etc.)
These application scenarios outline the need for pro-
tected biometric identifiers as dedicated form of a secure
Privacy-Enhancing Technology (PET) beyond symmetric or
asymmetric encryption of the biometric reference record. In
order to achieve biometric PET, this paper outlines a con-
cept that will be researched in the project TURBINE which
is funded under the EU 7th research framework programme.
The goal of this research is to provide significant advances
over currently used ID management techniques. This can
be reached with the following principal objectives:
• As opposed to current biometrics based identity man-
agement solutions, no trade-offs between high security
and respect of privacy shall be required; TURBINE
technology will simultaneously deliver both. It enables
high security for the operators/the authorities and un-
compromised levels of personal privacy for the indi-
vidual.
• Biometric templates of enrolled subjects are not stored.
Individual retain complete control of their biometric
data.
• Multiple identities, including pseudo-identities can be
generated from a single biometric characteristic with-
out any risk that these can be linked together; and any
of these identities can be cancelled and replaced by a
new one. The project will research the practical im-
pact of what happens when a biometric identity or a
pseudo-identity is breached and thus needs to be re-
voked. This will include the case where some or all of
the identities/pseudo-identities are stored on the user’s
tokens and may require continued validity for some
transitional period, which would depend on the actual
role/use of the identities. The ideal system will be flex-
ible and give several options to each of these scenarios.
• Higher security, because more complex identifiers with
inherent resistance to most of the known attacks (sub-
stitution, tampering, Trojan horse, masquerade, etc.,)
can be used.
• Interoperability: The capability to analyze biometric
references from multiple vendors (multi-source) will
be fostered regarding the protection mechanism, with-
out losing verification performance.
• The research will aim to develop the mechanisms that
are required to effectively operate the trusted pseudo-
identities built on protected fingerprint templates. In
line with the performance objectives of the template
protection processes, efficiency and ease of use will
be targeted to make the designed architecture a viable
privacy-enhanced user-centric solution with a high
level of trust.
Figure 1 illustrates the basic concept of pseudo identi-
ties. Sensitive information such as biometric samples or
biometric templates are processed such that the generated
biometric reference is a non-invertible yet unique identifier.
Figure 1. Pseudo identities derived from bio-
metric samples.
To achieve this level of innovation in the domain of iden-
tity management, TURBINE will carry out innovative re-
search and technology development work focused on the
underlying core technologies of both biometrics and cryp-
tography.
2 Related Work
Biometric template protection techniques provide tech-
nological means to protect the privacy of biometric refer-
ence information stored in biometric systems. These meth-
ods stand in sharp contrast to approaches where biometric
information is protected only by legislation and unreliable
procedures around storage facilities. Template protection
guarantees the protection of biometric information without
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the assumption that individuals must be trusted or proce-
dures are properly implemented. Template protection tech-
niques transform classical representations of biometric ref-
erences (e.g. the image of an iris, a feature vector derived
from a face, etc.) into a so-called secure template. These
secure templates are constructed such that it is very hard to
retrieve information regarding the original biometric sam-
ple. Furthermore, comparison is done directly on the secure
templates. Lastly, in many implementations of template
protection it is possible to derive several distinct secure tem-
plates from a single biometric characteristic. Template pro-
tection brings huge benefits for biometric systems[12].
A centralised database can be constructed in compliance
with privacy laws. Distinct templates from the same bio-
metric characteristic can also be generated for different ap-
plications, in order to reduce/eliminate possibility of cross
matching. Revocation and reissue is feasible in case of
such template compromise. Risks of spoofing attack us-
ing stored or transmitted template can also be prevented.
One of the first concepts for biometric template protection
was pioneered in 1994 by George Tomko[27]. Since then,
about 50 universities and commercial companies have re-
ported on similar types of technologies in scientific papers
and patents.
Key academic institutions and industry leaders are
Michigan State University, University of Bologna and IBM,
RSA, Sagem Se´curite´ and Philips, respectively1. Over
time, different approaches to template protection mecha-
nisms have been presented and the following ones seem
promising:
1. Biometric salting - Concatenated hash of biometric
templates with a high entropy ”password”.
2. Non-invertible transforms - Original biometric
samples cannot be extracted from the protected
templates[23], [24].
3. Fuzzy schemes - These methods are based on a fuzzy
commitment scheme[19], fuzzy extractors[13] and
helper-data schemes[21] (see also[16],[29]). Exam-
ples of practical implementation of fuzzy schemes are
given in[30], [28], [32], [17], [14], [33], [6], [9].
4. Fuzzy vault schemes - A particular family of fuzzy
schemes proposed by Juels and Sudan[18] based on
chaffing and winnowing. Example of implementations
for minutiae are[31], [22].
5. Secured comparison - Utilization of enhanced crypto-
graphic mechanisms to achieve comparison bit by bit
of data while still encrypted[4], [15], [26], [10], [8].
1Recent research projects include the french ANR RNRT project
BACH and the European FP6 project 3D-Face.
6. Or combination of several techniques, e.g.[7], [20],[9],
[11], [5].
Although there is a decade of history in biometric tem-
plate protection technology developments, to date, commer-
cial systems are not yet deployed. There are two main rea-
sons for this: (i) the technical difficulty in applying crypto-
graphic protection techniques on noisy biometric data and
(ii) the lack of awareness of these privacy enhancing tech-
nologies by the political decision makers. Also biomet-
ric protection techniques are difficult to apply to traditional
minutiae based fingerprint systems.
Figure 2. Template protection and hashing
The system presented by Ratha, Connell and Bolle is
proposing a solution for minutiae fingerprint [23]. The main
drawbacks of this approach are that it is not based on cryp-
tographic techniques and hence security cannot easily be
proved. Security of practical constructions have recently
been investigated by Scheirer [25]. The approach of using
fuzzy schemes combines cryptographic techniques with er-
ror correction coding so that off-the-shelf hashing tools can
be deployed. However, TURBINE will not confine itself
to off-the-shelf hashing tools. The error-correction makes
sure that stable feature vectors can be derived from the
noisy biometric input data. Practical implementations of
these systems for different biometric modalities like face,
pattern fingerprint and iris are successfully reported [30],
[28],[32],[17], [6],[9]. Although these systems are suited
for these modalities, current state-of-the-art does not allow
usage on minutiae-based fingerprint systems. In the TUR-
BINE project we focus on adapting this approach to minu-
tiae fingerprints.
This requires the processing of an unordered set of
”noisy” minutiae features (i.e. locations, ridge directions
etc). The goal of TURBINE is to find effective transforms
that translate these unordered feature sets to an ordered float
features vector, such that we obtain comparable matching
performance while introducing privacy protection.
Figure 2 shows the overall structure of such a system.
The first 3 blocks perform the feature extraction and subse-
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quent blocks the template protection and hashing. In gen-
eral, applying template protection may result in some per-
formance loss in terms of FAR and FRR of biometric sys-
tems. TURBINE will also address this problem and aims to
minimize the performance loss such that it becomes negli-
gible with respect to the current state of the EER art which
today is in the order of 10−2.
3 Project Objectives
TURBINE aims to explore and help to establish an inno-
vative use of cancellable fingerprint based identity manage-
ment for applications in the real and the virtual world that
will provide trust for service operators and end-users. The
project addresses the full-scale verification of identity.
In keeping with its intended use as a Privacy Enhanc-
ing Tool, and for instance in order to eliminate the need for
databases holding information on the protected templates,
TURBINE will allow an individual to hold a personal se-
cured token, to manage his identities (legal and pseudo),
such as a legal identity for central eGovernment or local
town hall services, and also various pseudo-identities, e.g.
for Internet services, loyalty cards etc. The identities are
consolidated from the same individual using a ”protected”
biometric template that can be cancelled and re-issued.
TURBINE research work will address the fundamental
challenges of fingerprint biometric cryptography and also
aim at establishing the large deployment capability of this
technology. It aims to eliminate the current perception
that increased security and privacy is a zero sum game,
by demonstrating that both are possible simultaneously and
that the authentication security needs of the operator and the
trust requirements (security and privacy) for the individual
can be consistently met in a convenient and application spe-
cific manner.
The underlying scientific/technical challenges and objec-
tives required to deliver a revocable protected biometrics
based identification include a range of specific functionali-
ties, distortion tolerance performance and other capabilities.
The relevant project objectives are briefly outlined and sum-
marised under the following headings:
1. Revocable protected biometrics references
Evaluate extent to which a practical protected finger-
print biometric reference can be consistently generated
from the fingerprint image shape and minutiae associ-
ated with the chosen transformations. Ensure that the
”protected” biometric information cannot be used to
derive the original biometric data (image or minutiae).
Ensure that the ”protected” biometric information can
be cancelled and a new replacement can be readily and
securely generated. Ensure that a protected biometric
sample can be processed to generate different applica-
tion specific results and that such capabilities are sup-
ported in the replacement biometric reference in the
event of cancellation for whatever reasons.
2. Distortion Tolerance Performance
Evaluate and ensure, possibly for example via a nor-
malisation and vector threshold scheme, that the as-
sociation of transformation and a captured fingerprint
can be used in instances where only a subset of the
fingerprint minutiae can be matched.
3. Evaluation at High Confidence Level
Evaluate and ensure targeted accuracy, reliability and
convenience in 1:1 verification implementations us-
ing available and independently compose fingerprint
databases. The primary scalability objective will be to
assess the applicability for very large population verifi-
cation systems and compile accurate performance data
confirming the success and providing important con-
textual information about such implementation (per-
formance, accuracy and exception processing).
4. Biometric Template Protection and Multi-source Inter-
operability
A specific objective will be to ensure that the protec-
tion deployed on the biometric sample has the lowest
possible impact on biometric verification performance.
The protection mechanisms must also be designed to
allow vendor independence via interoperable solutions
i.e. the protection mechanisms and transformation de-
ployed must ensure and allow that the Enrolment Al-
gorithm and Query Algorithm for key generation pro-
cess are well matched and separately usable by differ-
ent system vendors. (see next sub-section).
5. Interoperable ID management and standardisation
Any identity management scheme must be designed to
last for several years and be rolled out and adopted by
at least a significant number of the targeted population.
Standardisation of specific interchangeable elements,
and interoperability of identity management systems
are therefore essential. The key issue for TURBINE in
this respect is the capability to encourage and adopt in-
teroperable software and hardware components devel-
oped by different vendors. Ensuring adequate knowl-
edge and support for existing deployed solutions is es-
sential while ensuring sufficient flexibility and scope
to accommodate emerging standards and future evolu-
tions. Thus TURBINE will pay particular attention to
the process for developing and releasing the specifica-
tions that vendors must use to ensure the needed in-
teroperability. Contributions will be made by the con-
sortium to ISO/IEC JTC1 standardisation in SC37 and
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SC27 where WD ISO 24745 is relevant to the project
work.
6. Use of Smaller Fingerprint Templates
TURBINE will investigate the use of very small fin-
gerprint templates. The compact size of the template
is not the main goal. The objective is based on the
data protection principle of proportionality and ensur-
ing that the TURBINE solution can be tailored to mix
security and privacy according to the needs of specific
applications. From the ”minimal data” perspective it is
envisaged that the size of the fingerprint template could
be correlated with the level of security required for par-
ticular applications. Thus research will be conducted
on varying the size of the template and determining
how this may be used to meet levels of security in dif-
ferent identity verification scenarios. In addition, this
research will be used to position image size in relation
to boundary conditions in the entropy requirements for
biometric template protection.
7. Multi-application usage and Pseudo-identities
TURBINE will design and test a process and tech-
nology that allows the embedding of the interopera-
ble ”protected” biometric information into a secure to-
ken. The use and resilience of multi-application spe-
cific information based on the same biometric sam-
ple will also be evaluated. In this respect TURBINE
will propose and evaluate mechanisms for the man-
agement of secure tokens and multiple identities for a
same person, where each identity can be trusted based
on a protected biometric mechanism. This approach
must support provision of different pseudo-identities
for the same individual that are all protected and con-
solidated on the same secure token. These pseudo-
identities will also, where required, be compatible with
a ”legal” identity. This pseudo-identity requirement
is in line with the recommendations from previous
RTD projects like PRIME and INSPIRED (INtegrated
Secure Platform for Interactive tRusted pErsonal De-
vices) which have consistently shown that people also
need identities with a subset of information related to
the context of specific applications [3],[2].
8. Privacy protection / legal framework
The projects PRIME and BITE have confirmed that
identity information is considered as sensitive infor-
mation by the European citizen: there is an expectation
of adequate privacy protection and also for evidence of
a strong trusted authentication mechanism which min-
imises possibility of identity theft [3], [1]. A conse-
quence of citizen expectations in the context of new
emerging technologies is a new set of legal require-
ments and issues in the protection of private data. One
of the key objectives of the RTD work will be to ensure
that the developments of TURBINE efficiently address
privacy protection requirements according to the EU
and member state regulations and laws. It will study
and evaluate attack resistance and in particular provide
mechanisms to assess the level of trust inherent in such
solutions, and progress any recommendation provided
by the project regarding the current legal framework.
One of the challenges to achieve theses objectives is to
enhance the stability of existing fingerprint templates: Limit
the noise and variations of extracted minutiae and to explore
the mixing with additional fingerprint attributes to obtain
good foundations for the template protection mechanisms.
4 Conclusion
The multi-disciplinary project TURBINE presented in
this paper aims at producing a privacy enhancing technol-
ogy, combining innovative developments in cryptography
and fingerprint biometrics. It aims at providing highly reli-
able biometric 1:1 verifications, multi-vendor interoperabil-
ity, and system security, while solving major issues related
to privacy concerns associated to the use of biometrics for
ID management.
TURBINE will remove the current barriers in the use of
biometric solutions for user identification: for the first time,
no trade-off will need to be made between the level of se-
curity provided to the service supplier/merchant in terms of
secure authentication, and the level of security provided to
the individual in terms of protection of personal data. The
technology developed in TURBINE could be implemented
in a large variety of applications in the real and the virtual
world. To ensure that the developments meet the needs of
the various potential market segments and the European and
national regulations regarding privacy, the consortium will
benefit from the advice of experts in data protection from
different European institutions and from representative mar-
ket sectors, such as banking, eHealth, eGovernment, and
airport security.
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